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ADDRESSING SENTENCING DISPARITIES FOR TRIBAL 
CITIZENS IN THE DAKOTAS:  A TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
APPROACH 
BJ JONES* 
CHRISTOPHER J. IRONROAD** 
ABSTRACT 
 
Native Americans in the Dakotas can receive criminal sentences in 
federal courts that are harsher than sentences meted out for similar conduct 
in state courts.  The reason for this is the historical role the federal 
government has played in determining justice issues in tribal communities.  
Although the federal government oftentimes sought tribal input into justice 
issues in tribal communities, that input has not been sought in the area of 
sentencing of natives for offenses in federal courts, with some limited 
exceptions (death penalty and career offender sentencing).  This Article 
argues a need to change this practice and that Indian tribes, through an  
opt-in provision similar to other tribal opt-in provisions in the criminal 
justice arena, should have a right to dictate more equitable sentencing for 
their members when the sentencing disparity is stark and exists only 
because federal jurisdiction lies.  Such a remedy to disparate sentencing 
would not impact the prosecution of crime in tribal communities, but 
instead would ensure that native persons do not receive more punitive 
sentences merely because of their status as American Indians.  Because of 
the unique trust relationship between the United States and American 
Indian tribes, the United States has a legal and moral imperative to address 
this issue, similar in regards to the disparity in federal sentences for crack 
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versus powder cocaine offenses, which had a disproportionate impact upon 
African-Americans.  In particular, this Article examines the sentencing of a 
young native woman on the Fort Berthold reservation who was prosecuted 
for the death of an infant child and sentenced in accordance with federal 
guidelines that appear to be far out of proportion to similar sentences in 
state courts.  This Article suggests that a remedy for prior sentences be 
considered by Congress in light of the hesitancy of the executive branch to 
utilize its clemency powers to correct Native American sentencing 
injustices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article draws attention to the disparate sentences of Native 
Americans in the Dakotas for crimes prosecuted by the United States under 
the Major Crimes Act1 and federal subject matter jurisdiction statutes,2 as 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
2. The United States Department of Justice announced a policy of not referencing the 
quantity of drugs in federal indictments to ameliorate the impact of mandatory minimums in 
certain drug offenses, although it is not clear that this policy will be implemented in crimes 
occurring in Indian Country.  Many drug crimes are potentially subject to federal court 
jurisdiction, but the United States, on many occasions, declines to prosecute those crimes when 
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction exists, unless there is some interstate component to the 
distribution scheme, while they are more frequently prosecuted in tribal communities.  This may 
be because the United States Department of Justice has a policy, called the Petite policy, which 
directs it not to prosecute crimes subject to state jurisdiction if the potential penalties are 
comparable.  However, the Petite policy is rarely utilized in Indian Country, perhaps because of 
artificial limitations upon tribal sentencing authority imposed by Congress in the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1306 (2006).  See United States v. Lester, 85 F.3d 1409, 1413 (9th 
Cir. 1996).  A rare example of tribal-federal prosecution occurred on the Standing Rock 
Reservation, where the United States and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe collaborated to arrest and 
prosecute a drug distribution ring.  See Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, District of 
North Dakota, Operation Prairie Thunder Results In Drug Trafficking Charge, (June 5, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nd/news/2012/06-05-12-Operation%20Prairie%20 
Thunder html (last accessed Jan. 7, 2014). 
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compared to sentences for similar offenses under state law.  The United 
States has jurisdiction, concurrent with tribal governments, over certain 
enumerated offenses committed by Indians,3 some of which are ironically 
defined under state law.4  Because of congressional initiatives to exact 
harsher penalties for certain crimes as well as the impact of the federal 
sentencing guidelines—which in most situations forecloses sentence 
mitigation schemes such as parole—some Indian persons receive criminal 
sentences far out of proportion to what a non-Indian or Indian person would 
receive for similar criminal conduct prosecuted in a state forum.  This 
reality may, in certain situations, deter the prosecution of crimes 
prosecutable in federal courts because of a federal perception of unfairness,5 
but also in many cases, result in criminal sentences that are far out of 
proportion to the “actual” sentence that would be served under a state court 
conviction.6 
Recently, this reality was most poignantly addressed by United States 
Court of Appeals Senior Judge Myron Bright, who vividly depicted the 
 
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which enumerates fifteen offenses if committed by Indian persons 
in Indian Country, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006), would subject that person to federal 
court jurisdiction.  Most of the offenses contained therein are defined under federal law, but some, 
including burglary and felony child abuse or neglect, are actually defined under the substantive 
law of the state in which the crime occurs. 
4. See, e.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 to 16962 
(2006), which includes a fifteenth crime, felony child abuse or neglect, subject to federal 
jurisdiction.  The underlying substantive crimes, however, are defined under state laws, which 
have no applicability to Indians in Indian Country, yet the sentences received are the product of 
more draconian federal sentencing schemes. 
5. The United States has been the subject of much criticism from both tribal leaders and 
international rights organizations for the relatively low rates of prosecution for certain crimes 
under United States jurisdiction in Indian Country.  See Steven W. Perry, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
NCJ 239077, Tribal Crime Data Collection Activities (2012), http://www.bjs.gov 
/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4493.  However, there are situations where the United States could 
assert its authority to prosecute crime, but may stay its hand out of concern that the potential 
penalty may be out of proportion to the crime and instead permit tribal officials to prosecute.  This 
does not appear to be an illegitimate use of its authority and in some circumstances may be the 
more “just” option. 
This may have proved the impetus for the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which expands the 
sentencing authority of tribal governments from one year to three years and also requires the 
United States to provide more information to tribal governments when it declines to prosecute a 
crime.  Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–211, 124 Stat. 2258.  Some would 
contend that although the United States certainly has a responsibility to prosecute crime within its 
jurisdiction, when the exercise of that jurisdiction would result in a sentence far out of proportion 
to what the tribe would impose and the tribe is willing to provide a sentence permitting the 
offender to remain within the tribal community, then justice is achieved when the United States 
stays its hand. 
6. Of course, one reason for this is that prison sentences in the Dakotas are rarely served out 
in absolute time but are reduced by operations of parole, good time, and other sentence 
amelioration schemes that are not available for federal sentences because of the oftentimes harsh 
impact of the Sentencing Reform Act, passed in 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976. 
            
56 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:53 
injustices occasioned by these disparities in United States v. Deegan.7  The 
Deegan case involved a young Native woman, who was a victim of 
lifelong, horrific abuse.  She was prosecuted for second-degree murder 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and received a sentence of 121 months for the 
crime of neonaticide, which Judge Bright pointed out tended to be punished 
far less severely in North Dakota state court.  The federal court judge, who 
imposed the ten-year-plus sentence upon Ms. Deegan, failed to fully factor 
into the sentencing equation her life experiences and the mitigating factors 
which may have called for a lesser sentence because he was essentially 
deprived of that ability by federal law and sentencing guidelines.  Judge 
Bright’s dissent in Deegan has re-energized the discussion among many 
tribal leaders, federal judges, and prosecutors concerned about the tribal 
justice systems in Indian Country.  This examination includes sentencing 
disparities, how tribal and federal systems can work together to prosecute 
crime, and imposing appropriate penalties that do not result in the 
unnecessary displacement of Native persons from tribal communities when 
tribal options exist.  This is the inspiration for the authors’ critique of 
federal sentencing contained herein. 
This critique must not be confused with sympathy for criminals who 
commit crimes in tribal communities or for any call to lessen prosecution 
efforts.  Crime in tribal communities remains a pernicious problem,8 
detracting from the peace and quiet Native persons were promised in 
treaties and federal enactments designed to carry out the United States’ trust 
responsibility to Native persons.  Contradictory voices, however, perhaps 
send the wrong message to federal officials who are oftentimes criticized 
for not prosecuting enough crime in tribal communities, all the while 
receiving the brunt of criticism when tribal members are taken from their 
communities and sent hundreds of miles away to federal prisons where they 
lose all contacts with their families, traditions, and sometimes spiritual 
practices.  Native persons are not only disproportionately victims of crime,9 
 
7. 605 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 634 F.3d 428 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2094 (2011). 
8. According to recent statistics, crime in Indian Country remains stubbornly resistant to 
federal and tribal efforts to combat it.  See Laurel Morales, From Cops to Lawyers, Indian 
Country Copes with High Crime, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, http://www npr.org/2013 
/08/05/207067518/from-cops-to-lawyers-indian-country-copes-with-high-crime (last visited Jan. 
7, 2014) (for a recent National Public Radio series on crime in Indian communities). 
9. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD AND STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
173386, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME iii (1999).  This study revealed that Native persons 
experience violent crime at rates more than twice the national average and that one out of every 
four Native persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four had been the victims of crime. 
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but are also incarcerated at rates far out of proportion to other persons.10  
Statistically speaking, Native persons who commit crimes were more likely 
themselves to have been victims of crime at one time and their criminality 
is arguably related to their victimization.11  However, Native persons, 
because of the impact of the Major Crimes Act, are the only persons, with 
the exception of persons who commit violent crimes in federal enclaves, 
who bear the brunt of congressional acts designed to get tough on violent 
crimes.  These include such crimes as child abuse and sexual assaults, 
because the vast majority of those crimes are prosecuted by state 
prosecutors in state forums utilizing state law. 
When Congress acts to impose a mandatory minimum sentence upon 
sexual offenders or individuals who commit crimes while possessing 
firearms, Indian persons feel the brunt of such federal sentences more than 
other defendants.  Federal sentencing of Native offenders is oftentimes 
carried out based on a sentencing scheme which gives no consideration to 
the unique nature of the Indian Country jurisdiction of the federal courts.  
As this Article demonstrates, the wholesale adoption of federal criminal 
laws to crimes committed by Native persons in tribal communities was 
effectuated as the result of one isolated murder in Indian Country, in what is 
now South Dakota.  Congress intervened to extend federal court criminal 
jurisdiction over Indian Country because of a perception that Indian tribes 
were ill-equipped to deal with crime in their communities in a sufficiently 
punitive manner.12  Congress has moved forward since that time, with a few 
notable exceptions,13 to legislate in the crime arena with little to no regard 
for the tribal voice.  This needs to change. 
 
10. In South Dakota, the rate of incarceration for Native Americans is twenty-nine percent of 
all incarcerations, and thirty-eight percent of juvenile offenders in 2011, while only making up 8.9 
percent of the population.  Lisa Desjardins & Emma Lacey-Bordeaux, Problems of Liberty and 
Justice on the Plains, CNN, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/10/us/embed-america-
tribal-justice. 
11. Although there have been no studies documenting the correlation between victimization, 
and later in life criminality in Indian communities, the connection has been documented in other 
non-tribal communities.  For example, a National Institute of Justice study found that a child who 
was the victim of abuse or neglect had a twenty-eight percent higher chance of being arrested as 
an adult and a thirty percent chance of being arrested for a violent crime as an adult.  See CATHY 
S. WIDOM & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, NAT’L INST. JUST., AN UPDATE ON THE “CYCLE OF 
VIOLENCE,” RESEARCH IN BRIEF (2001). 
12. See Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-ca, 3 S. Ct. 396 (1883) (holding that the territorial court was 
without jurisdiction and that Crow Dog’s conviction and sentence was void and his imprisonment 
illegal).  “It is a case where . . . the law itself . . . judges them by a standard made by others, and 
not for them, which takes no account of the conditions which should except them from its 
exactions . . . .”  Id. at 406. 
13. Those exceptions include, inter alia, the federal death penalty opt-in provision.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3598 (2006) (requiring an Indian tribal government to opt in to the imposition of the 
death penalty in a case premised upon 18 U.S.C. § 1153 or § 1152), and for the career offender 
opt-in provision, see 18 U.S.C § 3559(c)(6) (2006).  
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This Article, like others written on the subject,14 calls for a reasonable 
solution to the disparities problem by permitting Indian tribes the right to 
opt in to a federal sentencing scheme where a federal court could depart 
downward to impose sentences upon Native persons more in line with state 
sentences, when such action would not violate federal law.  There are 
already provisions of federal law where tribal governments and their 
citizens are permitted a voice in the sentencing of Native offenders in 
federal court—including the imposition of the federal death penalty15 and 
the imposition of sentencing enhancement for career offenders16—so 
modifying the federal sentencing scheme to address state-federal disparities 
is not a radical departure from existing federal law.  The Major Crimes Act 
itself, at §1153(b), directs a federal court to utilize state substantive laws to 
determine the elements of certain criminal offenses.17  For other crimes 
prosecuted by the United States, under what is referred to as the 
Assimilative Crimes Act,18 the federal court is commanded to impose a 
sentence that is “likened” to the state sentence if the substantive crime is not 
defined under federal law.19  In such proceedings, a federal court is already 
required to determine what sentence a state would impose and order a 
similar federal sentence. 
Nor would a tribal opt-in impose an unreasonable burden upon federal 
judges and federal probation officers.  Sentencing in the federal system is 
already so mechanical that requiring the use of state sentences in Indian 
Country prosecutions, when an Indian tribe has opted in to such a system, 
only results in the comparison of state statistics for comparable crimes to 
the sentence resulting from the application of the federal sentencing 
guidelines—something the federal judiciary is surely equipped to handle.  
Nor would it impose any equal protection issues because only Natives are 
receiving the potential benefits or detriments of state sentencing in the 
federal courts.  The United States Supreme Court has reiterated numerous 
times that federal criminal jurisdiction is based upon the United States’ 
plenary relationship to Indian tribes, and differences in sentences based 
 
14. See generally Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing Disparity 
Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723 (2008); see also, Gregory D. Smith, Disparate Impact of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Indians in Indian Country:  Why Congress Should Run the Erie 
Railroad into the Major Crimes Act, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 483 (2004). 
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 3598. 
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(6). 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b). 
18. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (requiring that a person prosecuted in federal court for an offense 
assimilated by this provision be subject to state law “shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to 
a like punishment.”). 
19. Id.; see also, United States v. Engelhorn, 122 F.3d 508, 510 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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upon that plenary authority between Indian and non-Indian offenders do not 
implicate the equal protection rights of either.20 
Before examining a possible solution to the disparities problem, the 
problem itself must be defined.  In this regard, some of the evidence is 
statistical and some is anecdotal.  Because the United States Supreme Court 
made the federal sentencing guidelines discretionary rather than mandatory 
in United States v. Booker,21 the United States Attorney’s Office in North 
Dakota, for example, has prosecuted and gained convictions in 377 criminal 
cases for the ten most common crimes prosecuted in Indian Country, with 
an average sentence of sixty months.22  The average sentence for the crime 
of sexual assaults against children and adults under the Major Crimes Act 
has been 133 months, while the average sentence for manslaughter has been 
seventy-three months.  With average statistics, obviously some defendants 
are serving a much greater amount of jail time than the average and some 
are serving less than the average.  Again, because the federal system has no 
provision for parole or “good time,” these sentences are hard sentences—
nearly all of which are being served in their entirety.  State sentences are 
somewhat more difficult to glean information from because in both Dakotas 
a criminal sentence is rarely served out to its term.  A typical five-year 
prison sentence imposed in a state court in North or South Dakota, may 
result in a defendant actually serving less than twenty-five percent of the 
sentence because of good time accrued in prison, as well as the availability 
of parole, something eliminated in the federal system under the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.23 
Current literature suggests that the Dakotas produce great disparities in 
sentences.  For example, in a recent article published in the Marquette Law 
Review, the author wrote: 
In South Dakota, a defendant convicted of assault in state court 
receives an average sentence of twenty-nine months.  However, if 
a Native American defendant were to commit that same offense 
within one of the Indian reservations in South Dakota, the 
defendant would be prosecuted in federal court and receive an 
average sentence of forty-seven months.  This glaring disparity, 
whereby Native Americans prosecuted for aggravated assault in 
 
20. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004); see also United States v. Antelope, 
395 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2005). 
21. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
22. Id. at 245.  This information was provided to the authors by Wade Warren, Chief 
Probation Officer for the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota; see also, 
Appendix A. 
23. Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
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Indian country receive sentences sixty-two percent higher than 
defendants convicted in state court for the same offense, is a 
product of the complex jurisdictional arrangement surrounding 
Indian country and the rigidity of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.24 
While this article relates primarily to North and South Dakota, the issue 
is germane to all states in which Indian reservations are located, and where 
the result is the federal prosecution of Native defendants.  Droske observes, 
“In New Mexico, for example, the average sentence for a sex offense was 
twenty-five months, compared to eighty-six months in federal court.”25  
That article quotes Judge Charles B. Kornmann, a South Dakota federal 
district judge, as follows: 
Ask virtually any United States District Judge presiding over cases 
from Indian Country whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are fair to 
Native Americans; ask virtually any appellate judge dealing with cases from 
Indian Country the same question, and I believe the answer would largely 
be the same:  No.  Too often are we required to impose sentences based on 
injustice rather than justice, and this bothers us greatly.26 
That article proposes a method by which federal judges can 
downwardly depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines established by 
the United States Sentencing Commission.  Native American defendants’ 
sentences can better align with corresponding state sentences in cases in 
which an Indian tribe exercises jurisdiction over the territory where the 
crime occurred.  The tribe may choose to permit the federal court to 
sentence in accordance with state law if a substantial disparity is shown.27  
The most recent law reference is entitled “Tribal Control of Federal 
Sentencing,” wherein the author explains in an opening statement the 
following: 
Federal Indian country prosecutions bring together two very 
complicated areas of law: Indian country criminal jurisdiction and 
federal sentencing.  This Part explains which Indian country 
defendants the federal government prosecutes and how they are 
sentenced.  This background will show how federal jurisdiction 
 
24. Droske, supra note 16, at 723. 
25. Id. at 724 n.4. 
26. Id. at 725 (quoting Charles B. Kornmann, Injustices:  Applying the Sentencing Guidelines 
and Other Federal Mandates in Indian Country, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 71, 71 (2000)). 
27. Id. 
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and sentencing systematically create harsher sentences for Indian 
defendants than for non-Indian defendants.28 
Another periodical of importance carries the title “Disparate Impact of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Indians in Indian Country:  Why 
Congress Should Run the Erie Railroad into the Major Crimes Act.”29  
Some comments are appropriate.  The author in the introduction writes: 
Why Congress would have done this is beyond me.  There is 
apparently a never ending trail of Congress making almost 
everything a federal crime.  The vast majority of members of 
Congress apparently give no thought to what they are doing to 
Native Americans who are then made subject to these federal 
crimes, carrying penalties out of all proportion to penalties found 
outside Indian Country.30 
Each of these scholarly articles refers to the Report of the Native 
American Advisory Group, issued in November 2003.31  The Advisory 
Group Report will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article.32 
In summary, the sentencing of Native Americans in federal courts in 
this country has not kept pace with the overriding federal policy regarding 
the treatment of Indian tribes as sovereign nations whom the United States 
deals with on a nation-to-nation relationship.  Congress has moved toward 
Indian self-determination in numerous areas since the previous era of 
federal policy known as tribal termination.33  However, federal sentencing 
laws and practices of the federal government have been a glaring example 
of anti-tribal sovereignty and thus are in sore need of re-examination. 
 
28. Emily Tredeau, Tribal Control in Federal Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1411 
(2011). 
29. Smith, supra note 16, at 483. 
30. Id. at 484. 
31. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP 
(2003), available at www.ussc.gov/ResearchProjects/Miscellaneous/20031104NativeAmerican 
Advisory_Group_Report.pdf. [hereinafter “ADVISORY GROUP REPORT”]. 
32. See infra Part III.  
33. In the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (“ISDEAA”), 
Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88. Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450), Congress directed federal 
agencies to contract directly with Indian tribes to run functions of the federal government that deal 
directly with tribes such as, inter alia, benefits, human services, and child protection.  This law 
laid the foundation for numerous other laws passed since then treating Indian tribes as sovereign 
nations, including the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963) (“ICWA”); and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 
Pub L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701) (“IGRA”). 
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II. FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND THE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 
The imposition of criminal sentences upon tribal citizens for 
committing crimes in Indian Country has its antecedents in a particularly 
anti-tribal climate.  Congress, by passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (“ICRA”),34 with little to no tribal input, artificially restricted tribal 
courts to maximum one-year sentences for crimes as serious as rape and 
murder.  The United States Supreme Court conjured up various reasons to 
deny Indian tribes the right to prosecute all persons who commit crimes in 
tribal communities.35  Federal prosecutors and the judiciary have gone 
about sentencing Indians for federal crimes with little to no restraint or 
concern for tribal interests.  This history is important because it 
demonstrates that, unlike other areas of the law where Indian tribes and 
their citizens have been consulted by the federal government before serious 
decisions are made by the United States, acting as the trustee for tribal 
citizens,36 decisions on what punishments the federal courts should mete out 
 
34. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 32 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303).  This law 
originally restricted tribal courts to the imposition of six month sentences.  Later it was amended 
to permit a maximum tribal sentence of one year.  It was amended anew by the Tribal Law and 
Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2801). 
35. The Supreme Court has, on two occasions, held that Indian tribes are implicitly divested 
of authority to prosecute crimes committed by certain persons in Indian Country, including non-
Indians.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (holding Indian tribal courts do 
not have jurisdiction over non-indains); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (“tribal power 
does not extend beyond internal relations among members.”).  The latter decision resulted in the 
intolerable situation where certain crimes committed by Indian persons against other Indian 
persons that did not rise to the level of Major Crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 were not subject to 
prosecution by any entity because of the divestiture of state jurisdiction under the General Crimes 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §1152.  Congress responded by superseding the decision by amending the Indian 
Civil Rights Act to recognize the inherent authority of Indian tribes to prosecute all Indians who 
commit criminal offenses in Indian Country.  See Lara, 541 U.S. at 199. 
36. See ISDEAA, 88 Stat. 2203 (Authorizing the Secretaries of the Departments of the 
Interior, Health and Human Services, and Education, inter alia, to enter into contracts with, and 
make grants directly to, federally recognized Indian tribes, giving tribes authority for how they 
administer the program and funds, and thus greater control over their welfare generally.  The 
ISDEAA made self-determination the focus of government action.  The Act reversed a thirty-year 
effort by the federal government under its preceding termination policy to sever treaty 
relationships with and obligations to Indian tribes); ICWA, 92 Stat. 3069 (Congress finding “an 
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of 
their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high 
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; 
and that the States . . . have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people 
and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families); IGRA,102 
Stat. 2467 (“The Congress finds that—(1) numerous Indian tribes have become engaged in or 
have licensed gaming activities on Indian lands as a means of generating tribal governmental 
revenue; (2) Federal courts have held that [Section 81] . . . of this title requires Secretarial review 
of management contracts dealing with Indian gaming, but does not provide standards for approval 
of such contracts; (3) existing Federal law does not provide clear standards or regulations for the 
conduct of gaming on Indian lands; (4) a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote 
            
2013] ADDRESSING TRIBAL SENTENCING DISPARITIES  63 
to Native Americans have largely been the by-product of the United States’ 
attempts to “get tough on crime.” 
The authors have written extensively on how the United States came to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction in tribal communities.37  Suffice it to say, it 
was not in response to requests from tribal nations.  This history can be 
traced to Ex parte Crow Dog,38 a case where a Lakota Indian, Crow Dog, 
killed another Lakota man, Spotted Tail, in the early 1880s, on what is now 
the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation in South Dakota.  At the time of the 
killing, the Tribe did not have a formalized court system to resolve disputes 
that were traditionally resolved by the tiospayes, or extended families, that 
respected each side in a conflict.  Nor at the time was there federal statutory 
support for the invocation of federal jurisdiction, as the only law in place at 
the time—the General Crimes Act—did not permit federal jurisdiction 
when one Indian committed a crime against another Indian, the situation in 
Crow Dog’s case.  The Tribe, invoking traditional custom and practice, 
required Crow Dog to provide certain necessities for Spotted Tail’s family, 
a type of restitution that restored the loss of Spotted Tail. 
Into this fray stepped the Dakota territorial government, who 
prosecuted Crow Dog for murder in a territorial court and convicted and 
sentenced him to death.  The United States Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and held that the territorial courts of the United States had not 
been vested with the jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by one 
Indian against another within an Indian reservation.39  The Fort Laramie 
Treaty of 1868 also did not give the federal government such authority.  
The result of this decision was that the Sicangu Band of the Lakota was left 
to its own principles of justice when determining punishments for those 
Band members who committed crimes against other Indians—a form of 
justice the Lakota and many other tribal nations had practiced since time 
immemorial. 
Although the decision was, in its result, a somewhat haphazard 
endorsement of tribal sovereignty, it was clearly based upon the notion that 
tribal citizens were inferior to non-Indians and thus could not fully 
understand the sense of justice meted out in the non-Indian courts.  
 
tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government; and (5) Indian 
tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is 
not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a 
matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.”). 
37. See generally B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity:  
Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV.457 (1998). 
38. See Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-ca, 3 S. Ct. at 396. 
39. Id. at 407. 
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According to the United States Supreme Court, it was unfair to try Crow 
Dog in a federal court for the following reason: 
[That court] tries them not by their peers, nor by the custom of 
their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a 
different race, according to the law of a social state of which they 
have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the 
traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the 
strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one of which measures 
the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s 
morality.40 
The federal government enacted the Major Crimes Act to fill what was 
perceived as a void in the enforcement of law created by the Crow Dog 
decision.41  The Major Crimes Act specifies certain felonies, now fifteen, 
committed by an Indian person in Indian Country and vests the federal 
(then territorial) courts with jurisdiction over such offenses.  This 
jurisdiction is not exclusive, however, since tribal courts can exercise 
concurrent authority over such crimes;42 though the right of Indian tribes to 
handle serious crimes committed by their members was largely emasculated 
in 1968 when Congress limited tribal sentencing authority to six months, 
but later expanded that authority to twelve months.  While this sentencing 
authority has once again been expanded granting tribes the right to impose 
sentences of up to three years per offense and nine years for the same 
criminal transaction,43 the quid pro quo for the exercise of such jurisdiction 
has been an almost complete acceptance of the western system of justice 
that Crow Dog supposedly could not understand because of his savagery.44 
 
40. Id. at 406.  The Supreme Court used these supposed different paradigms of justice 
Natives and non-Natives utilize in their systems later in Oliphant to strip Indian tribes of criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian Country, postulating that it was unfair 
for Indian tribes to mete out their inferior form of justice to non-Indians who, citing its decision in 
Crow Dog, could not possibly understand Native justice.  
41. It is an infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this nation, that there should be 
anywhere within its boundaries a body of people who can, with absolute impunity, 
commit the crime of murder, there being no tribunal before which they can be brought 
for punishment.  Under our present law, there is no penalty that can be inflicted except 
according to the custom of the tribe, which is simply that of the blood avenger that is, 
the next of kin of the person murdered shall pursue the one who has been guilty of the 
crime and commit a new murder upon him. 
48th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885) (statement of Congressman Byron 
Cutcheon). 
42. See generally Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that even though the 
Major Crimes Act references the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the United States over the crimes 
enumerated therein, Congress did not preempt inherent tribal court jurisdiction over those crimes). 
43. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261. 
44. One of the requirements for tribes to enhance their sentencing authority is to provide to 
defendants law-trained legal counsel, at the tribe’s expense, and judges trained in the western legal 
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The Major Crimes Act was thus a law premised upon a notion of Anglo 
superiority and tribal naiveté, and this paternalistic attitude, evident even in 
the latest federal forays into tribal justice systems in the Tribal Law and 
Order Act, sees its most punitive impact in the application of the federal 
sentencing laws and guidelines to tribal communities.  Even when 
upholding its constitutionality in the face of a legal challenge to the Major 
Crimes Act applying to tribal citizens in United States v. Kagama,45 the 
Supreme Court gave little consideration to any argument that the law should 
be sensitive to the unique condition of Native persons and was not 
countenanced by any power granted to the federal government in the United 
States Constitution.46  The Court in Kagama held: 
[T]he power of the General Government over these remnants of a 
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is 
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those 
among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because 
it never has existed anywhere else . . . and because it has never 
been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on the 
tribes.47 
This tautological rationale for upholding federal court authority over 
Native crime—it exists because the federal government says it exists—is 
now referred to as the “plenary power doctrine” and has resulted in both 
positive and negative legislative enactments for tribal communities.  In the 
criminal jurisdiction arena, it has been exercised with little to no regard for 
how federal laws and policies will impact Native persons.  When Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3242, essentially assimilating all of federal procedural 
and sentencing law into Indian Country offenses, it did not solicit input 
from elected tribal leaders or tribal citizens.  In 1984, when Congress 
passed the Sentencing Reform Act—passed as part of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 198448—there was no attempt to gather tribal input 
into how the law would impact the prosecution of Native persons in tribal 
communities; though, it may be naive to believe that, had Indian tribes 
voiced some objections to the law, the legislation would have been altered 
in any meaningful way.  However, given the atmosphere in which the 
country found itself at that time, it would have been appropriate to at least 
have consulted with tribal leaders and their citizens, especially in light of 
 
system.  Therefore, tribes that utilize traditional systems of justice (including non-law-trained 
elders and traditional spokespersons for citizens) are not entitled to seek enhanced sentences. 
45. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
46. Id. at 378-83. 
47. Id. at 384-85. 
48. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
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the passage of the ISDEAA only nine years earlier.  Subsequent federal 
laws have resulted in enhanced sentencing of Native offenders in federal 
courts, oftentimes passed as the result of some crime committed against a 
child not related in any way to Indian Country.  For example, both the 
Adam Walsh49 and Jacob Wetterling Acts50 were passed in a bi-partisan 
manner with congressional speeches proclaiming that the country would be 
rendered safer by the Acts of Congress, when in reality the overwhelming 
majority of prosecutions occur only in Indian Country cases.51 
Tribal leaders and members have perhaps been reticent about these 
developments because they fear the alternative to federal court jurisdiction 
even more.  Tribal leaders are also concerned about crime in their 
communities and may hesitate to criticize federal efforts to strengthen law 
enforcement and prosecution activities in tribal communities.  After all, 
criminals are not a popular constituency.  However, when Indian persons 
receive harsher sentences in federal court than those who commit similar 
crimes in state courts—whether non-Indian or Indian—the plenary power 
doctrine is not a sufficiently moral explanation of why this is occurring. 
III. THE ADVISORY GROUP REPORT 
The problem of disparate sentencing inflicted upon Native persons has 
been the subject of recent attention.  The notion to form an Advisory Group 
on Native American Sentencing Issues grew out of a United States 
Sentencing Commission meeting held in Rapid City, South Dakota, in June 
2001.52  The Advisory Group consisted of fourteen distinguished members, 
including federal district judges, a federal magistrate judge, a federal 
probation officer, and a distinguished group of men and women with Native 
American backgrounds, including now Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs 
Kevin Washburn.53  The chair of the Advisory Group was Chief Judge 
Lawrence L. Piersol of the District of South Dakota.54  The Advisory Group 
Report is in effect the parent of the three law review articles cited earlier 
herein. 
 
49. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16962. 
50. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4071 (2006). 
51. The Adam Walsh Act added a new felony to the Major Crimes Act—felony child 
abuse—and due to the fact that only Indians can be prosecuted under the MCA, this law only 
applies to native offenders. 
52. ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 33, at 3. 
53. Id. at 3. 
54. Id. at 2.  Judge Piersol had earlier recommended to the Sentencing Commission that in 
sentencing, federal judges be permitted to consider comparable state court sentences.  See 
generally Tredeau, supra note 30.  That option is presently not part of authorized sentencing 
procedures in the federal courts. 
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Relying upon available data, the Advisory Group limited its study to 
federal offenses most often prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act,55 and 
while second-degree murder was not examined, other types of homicide 
were considered.56  In involuntary manslaughter cases, almost seventy-five 
percent of those cases related to Native Americans and many related to the 
offender’s use of alcohol in a motor vehicle.57  The statistics upon which 
the Advisory Group relied came mostly from South Dakota and New 
Mexico.58 
In addition, the Advisory Group noted that Indians were the largest 
demographic of defendants prosecuted in voluntary manslaughter cases.59  
However, the largest area of concern relates to sexual abuse cases, which 
represents a very serious and pervasive problem on many reservations.60  
The Advisory Group Report stated, “sentences for sexual abuse offenders in 
the federal courts are more severe than state sentences,”61 mentioning 
federal sentences of Indians in South Dakota and New Mexico as much 
more severe than comparable state sentences for similar crimes.62 
With respect to serious assaults, Indians are more likely than any other 
ethnic group to be incarcerated for assault as observed in the Advisory 
Group Report:  “While Indians represent less than 2% of the U.S. 
population, they represent about 34% of individuals in federal custody for 
assault.”63  In later statistics, the Droske article shows that for assault in 
South Dakota, an Indian offender receives a much more severe sentence: 
the state court average sentence in 2002 was twenty-two months,64 while 
the federal court average sentence in 2005 was forty-seven months, or 
nearly four years.65  The disparity gap appears to be getting wider as the 
years go by.  The Advisory Group Report requested that action be taken by 
the Sentencing Commission to lower the base offense for assault to 
diminish the sentencing impact on Native American defendants.66 
 
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
56. ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 33, at i. 
57. Id. at V.B.1, 14-15. 
58. Id. at 31. 
59. Id. at 18. 
60. Id. at 20-21. 
61. Id. at 21. 
62. Id. at 21-22. 
63. Id. at 30-31. 
64. Droske, supra note 16, at 745. 
65. Id. at 743. 
66. ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 33, at 34 (“[T]he Ad Hoc Advisory Group 
strongly recommends that the Commission lower the base offense level for assault to lessen the 
disparity between federal and state sentences, thus diminishing the impact on Indian defendants.”). 
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These and other important recommendations of the Advisory Group 
Report, however, were not ultimately adopted by the Sentencing 
Commission.  Other recommendations included mitigation for the role 
alcohol plays in prosecuting Native Americans in most crimes and urging 
the Sentencing Commission to engage in meaningful consultation with 
tribal governments.67  The Sentencing Commission seemingly considered 
the Advisory Group Report, but the Commission ultimately failed to take 
any meaningful action on its findings. 
More than ten years have passed since the Advisory Group Report was 
published.  Since then, countless Native Americans have been and will 
continue to be sentenced in federal court pursuant to federal law and 
sentencing guidelines.  For more accurate and current data, the Sentencing 
Commission should form a new advisory group on Native American 
sentencing disparity issues with the charge to prepare an updated report.  
Such a report could demonstrate whether, post-Booker, the disparity in 
sentences meted out to Native Americans has declined with the exercise of 
judicial discretion.  Unfortunately, our review of a handful of cases within 
the Eighth Circuit suggests that the status quo has been maintained post-
Booker.68  Of course, even if a new report were to be published, much work 
would remain to get the Sentencing Commission to act upon the report’s 
recommendations the next time around.  In any event, however, such a 
report would be valuable to reference in drafting a legislative fix. 
IV. DISPARATE SENTENCING OF NATIVE AMERICANS 
The disparate sentences imposed on Native Americans compared to 
similar crimes committed nearby in the same state, or even town, cry out for 
relief.  These disparate sentences may be seen as just one more example of 
a well-documented history of discrimination against Native Americans, 
though perhaps in this instance the discrimination is more backhanded than 
explicit.  Two fairly recent federal cases, one in North Dakota and one in 
South Dakota, serve as vivid examples of basic unfairness in the sentencing 
of Native Americans in federal court, and may suggest a remedy. 
First, an examination of the South Dakota federal case, United States v. 
Boneshirt,69 is warranted.  The crime of second-degree murder committed 
by the defendant, Boneshirt, was indeed serious and called for both swift 
and firm justice.  Boneshirt, age seventeen, while in the process of having 
consensual sex with a nineteen-year-old female Native American woman, 
 
67. Id. at 37-38. 
68. See infra Part IV. 
69. 662 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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choked her to death after an argument had ensued.  In a plea agreement with 
the government, the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder after 
he reached the age of eighteen.  While awaiting sentencing, he participated 
in a plan to escape from county jail.  Although the plan to escape was 
ultimately thwarted by prison officials, his participation in the plan 
necessarily impacted his sentencing.  The probation officer calculated a 
guideline sentence of thirty years to life.70 
The court in sentencing Boneshirt considered the sentencing guidelines 
as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  In addition, the court was presented with a 
chart detailing sentences for murder in the federal courts of South Dakota 
and the Eighth Circuit, with an alleged median of twenty-eight and a half 
years or less.71  Those sentences were considerably less harsh than the 
sentence of forty-eight years that the judge actually imposed upon 
Boneshirt, even when considering additional time for Boneshirt’s 
participation in the plan to escape from county jail.  While the South 
Dakota state sentences were not in the record, this sentence greatly exceeds 
any state sentence for second-degree murder.  In fact, the record in 
Boneshirt disclosed that the forty-eight year sentence was more than double 
the mean sentence for murder in the Eighth Circuit over the previous five 
years,72 which at the time amounted to slightly less than twenty-one years 
(250 months).73 
This discussion is not to criticize the sentence or its affirmance by the 
Eighth Circuit panel, with one dissenting vote, but rather to observe and 
draw attention to the severity under federal sentencing practices and 
procedures affecting an Indian defendant who committed his crime on an 
Indian reservation in South Dakota.  A non-Indian, or even an Indian 
committing a similar offense just outside of the reach of Indian Country 
jurisdiction, would not receive such a harsh penalty under state law.  Thus, 
it is no wonder the dissent in Boneshirt questioned the sentence as 
“unreasonable.”74 
A second and equally important sentencing disparity case is the North 
Dakota federal case, United States v. Deegan.75  This case is the most 
striking example of harsh disparity between a federal sentence for a crime 
as compared to a state sentence for a similar crime.  In the Deegan case, a 
 
70. Id. at 512. 
71. Id. at 514 n.2. 
72. Id. at 522 n.5. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 521 (Bright, J., dissenting) (stating “[B]oneshirt’s forty-eight-year sentence is 
substantively unreasonable because the district court unreasonably weighed the facts at issue in 
the case.”). 
75. 605 F.3d 625. 
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Native American woman on the Fort Berthold Reservation, located in 
western North Dakota, gave birth at her home and then allowed her 
newborn to die within twenty-four hours of birth.  Ms. Deegan, as a 
defendant, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and pursuant to the 
guidelines for sentencing received a federal sentence of more than ten years 
(121 months).76 
As explained in the record of Deegan, this sort of crime is known as 
“neonaticide.”77  An expert on the crime, Dr. Phillip Resnick explained 
during his testimony in the Deegan case: 
[N]eonaticide is simply the killing of a newborn infant on the first 
day of life.  It’s actually a term that I coined in an article I wrote in 
1969 where I was distinguishing that type of killing of a baby, 
which has very different characteristics, from the killing of a baby 
who is older or a child.  And so neonaticide has universally been 
accepted now as a particular phenomenon when the baby is killed 
the first day of life.78 
Judge Bright contended in his dissenting opinion that “no basis exists 
to place neonaticide within the mine-run guidelines for second-degree 
murder.”79  The dissent argued that the district court erred in imposing the 
121 month sentence, noting that the Sentencing Reform Act allows the 
district court to depart from the sentencing guidelines in cases which 
present “atypical features,” such as in Ms. Deegan’s case.80 
Dr. Resnick offered testimony at Ms. Deegan’s sentencing hearing 
about women who commit the crime of neonaticide.81  Applicable to Ms. 
Deegan, the following was testified to by Dr. Resnick: 
Such a mother is often in an overwhelming state of desperation at 
the time of her infant’s birth and lacks adequate resources to 
mentally handle the situation of delivering a child.  She often 
conceals and denies her pregnancy, lacks insight into the situation, 
shows poor judgment, is cognitively immature with limited 
intelligence, and lacks sufficient coping skills.  [The] commonly 
 
76. Id. at 637. 
77. For a discussion of this act and its criminalization, see K. Drescher-Burke, J. Krall, and 
A. Penick, Discarded Infants and Neonaticide:  A Review of the Literature, NAT’L ABANDONED 
INFANTS RES. CTR. (2004) http://aia.berkeley.edu/media/pdf/discardedinfantsliteraturereview.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014).  This article examines the average sentence for the crime and finds that 
most sentences were light in comparison to murders of adults running from probation to thirty 
years in prison.  
78. Deegan, 605 F.3d at 642-43 (citation omitted). 
79. Id. at 646 
80. Id. at 645 (citation omitted). 
81. Id. at 642-43. 
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reported profile [of a homicidal mother] describes a woman 
usually in her twenties, who grew up or currently lives in poverty, 
is under-educated, has a history of abuse (both physical and 
sexual), remains isolated from social supports, has depressive and 
suicidal tendencies, and is usually experiencing rejection by a male 
lover at the time of the murders.82 
Prior to testifying, Dr. Resnick conducted an interview with Ms. 
Deegan and reviewed medical, psychiatric, and other relevant records 
pertaining to her.  Upon completion of his review, Dr. Resnick diagnosed 
Ms. Deegan with suffering or having suffered from the following three 
psychiatric disorders:  Major Depressive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, and Dysthymic Disorder.83  Dr. Resnick noted in his report “that 
at the time Ms. Deegan delivered her infant, she was severely depressed, 
overwhelmed by the state of her life, and ‘simply did not have the 
psychological resources to care for a fourth child.’”84 
According to the opinion, Ms. Deegan had suffered severe abuse both 
as a child and later as an adult.  She was twenty-five years old on the day 
her baby was born.  She thought that by allowing the infant to die, she 
would be protecting her three daughters.  She lived in abject poverty with a 
common law-type spouse who was an alcoholic and a drug user and who 
frequently abused her.  Dr. Resnick’s testimony explained that neonaticide 
is typical of persons like Ms. Deegan. 
Around the same time Ms. Deegan committed her offense, in the City 
of Fargo at a sorority house at North Dakota State University (“NDSU”), a 
young student similarly allowed her newborn to die in the first twenty-four 
hours.85  The student experienced extreme emotional pressure because she 
feared her mother would discover her sexual activities.86  The defendant 
NDSU student was prosecuted in North Dakota state court pursuant to state 
law and received a sentence of three years probation with time suspended, 
after pleading guilty to negligent homicide.87 
In another example, several years later, a woman from Bismarck, North 
Dakota, gave birth at her home and subsequently drowned the newborn 
shortly thereafter.88  The woman was diagnosed with a number of mental 
 
82. Id. at 643. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. (citation omitted). 
85. See N.D. v. N.D. State Univ. Student, Case No. 09-00-K-01202-1 (2000) (on hand with 
the authors). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 656. 
88. See, N.D. v. Glum, Case No. 08-07-K-02741 (2007) (on hand with the authors); see also 
Jenny Michael, Glum to Serve Two Years for Infant Death, THE BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Dec. 16, 
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health problems, including, inter alia, depression, posttraumatic stress 
disorder, and schizoaffective disorder.89  The defendant Bismarck woman 
pleaded guilty to felony manslaughter and was sentenced in North Dakota 
state court to two years in prison with time suspended.90 
The disparity in these sentences is stark.  Ms. Deegan was sentenced to 
more than ten years hard time in federal prison, while the other women who 
committed very similar offenses were sentenced under state law to 
probation and two years in prison, respectively.  In the Deegan case, Dr. 
Resnick informed the court that women who pleaded guilty to neonaticide 
are “infrequently sentenced to more than three years in prison.”91  Dr. 
Resnick’s statement appears to be fairly accurate with respect to defendants 
who plead guilty to the crime of neonaticide, unless the defendant is subject 
to federal law and sentencing guidelines. 
The authors note, however, the dissent’s observation in Deegan, that 
the crime of neonaticide is almost unknown in the federal courts.92  Thus 
perhaps the unknown nature of the crime itself caused the district court to 
adopt the prosecution’s recommendation regarding where Ms. Deegan’s 
offense fit within the guidelines sentencing range.  Whether this supposition 
is correct, it’s clear the sentencing court could have benefitted from a 
review of neonaticide case sentences in state court. 
Again, it is not the intent of the authors of this article to criticize the 
sentences of either Ms. Deegan, the NDSU student, or the Bismarck 
woman.  However, the authors do seek to bring to light the similarity of the 
offenses and the grossly disparate sentences imposed upon the defendants. 
V. REMEDYING THE DISPARATE SENTENCING OF NATIVE 
AMERICANS 
Federal courts should be granted the authority, upon the exercise of an 
opt-in by an Indian tribe which exercises governmental authority over the 
Indian Country where a particular crime occurs, to depart downward and 
impose a sentence upon a Native offender comparable to a typical sentence 
imposed in a state court for a similar offense if the disparity in state and 
federal law is of a certain significance.  The degree of significance is open 
to debate, as is the issue of whether federal courts should be able to depart 
upward in cases where the federal sentence is significantly less than that 
 
2009), available at http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/glum-to-serve-two-years-for-infant-
death/article_9b1332a2-ea7a-11de-a460-001cc4c002e0 html (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 657. 
92. Id. at 636. 
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typically imposed by state law.  Arguments could be made that such an 
upward departure would be the logical extension of giving Indian tribes 
some input into federal sentencing decisions.  A federal probation officer 
could furnish the information pertaining to a comparable state court system, 
factoring in parole eligibility and good time computation, in a pre-sentence 
report, which would then permit a federal judge to determine whether his 
discretion to depart downward (or upward) is triggered. 
A similar argument could be made for non-Indian offenders who are 
prosecuted in federal court under the provisions of the General Crimes 
Act,93 but it is politically as well as constitutionally dubious whether an 
Indian tribe could be given an opt-in that may determine a non-Indian’s 
sentence.  However, Congress may see fit to permit a downward or upward 
departure in those cases if the Indian tribe with jurisdiction over the 
particular territory where the crime occurred has chosen to opt in. 
Permitting such tribal authority is not unheard of.  Currently, under 
federal law, if a tribal citizen commits a crime that is prosecutable under 
either the Major Crimes Act or the General Crimes Act, and a potential 
penalty could be death under federal law, the death penalty is not an option 
unless the Indian tribe with jurisdiction over the territory where the crime 
occurred has opted in to the death penalty by tribal resolution.94  If the 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes in Indian Country is contingent 
upon some tribal input, why not the disparity issue raised by this article?  
Similarly, the federal career offender rule—which mandates the imposition 
of harsher sentences in federal courts upon those persons who have 
committed prior crimes—does not apply in Indian Country unless a tribe 
has opted in.95  Nor does the law permitting a federal court to treat a minor 
under sixteen as an adult for purposes of a criminal prosecution in federal 
court apply to youthful Indian offenders unless there is an opt-in.96 
All of these models can be utilized in drafting legislation to permit an 
opt-in to address the sentencing disparity issue.  Some have suggested that 
the tribal opt-in should permit a tribe to require state sentencing in all cases 
involving tribal citizens prosecuted in that tribe’s jurisdiction.97  Although 
 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (“Notwithstanding sections 1152 and 1153, no person subject to 
the criminal jurisdiction of an Indian tribal government shall be subject to a capital sentence under 
this chapter for any offense the Federal jurisdiction for which is predicated solely on Indian 
country (as defined in § 1151 of this title) and which has occurred within the boundaries of Indian 
country, unless the governing body of the tribe has elected that this chapter have effect over land 
and persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction.”). 
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(6). 
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
97. See generally Jones, supra note 39. 
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this is certainly an option, the authors do not believe that the opt-in should 
be triggered unless there is a significant disparity in sentences.  Indian tribes 
may be disinclined to opt in to state sentencing schemes because of the 
mistrust of state laws and institutions and the law will therefore never be 
utilized.  Additionally, there is no moral imperative to apply state 
sentencing law in cases where the federal sentence imposed is similar to the 
state sentence, taking parole and early release into consideration.  The 
problem that this article addresses is not the fact that Indian citizens are 
sentenced to federal prison for significant time, but that sometimes the 
sentences they receive are so far out of proportion to what a person would 
receive in state court that an injustice occurs.  This problem does not exist 
with regard to other federal crimes because it is only in Indian Country that 
the United States prosecutes certain crimes generally left to state 
jurisdictions everywhere else in the United States. 
Some may suggest that the United States Sentencing Commission can 
simply add another ground to downwardly depart from a presumptive 
sentence under the sentencing guidelines to address these disparities, as 
opposed to Congress enacting legislation that includes a tribal opt-in 
provision.  This approach, however, ignores the fact that some tribal 
governments may be supportive of the imposition of harsher sentences upon 
those who commit crimes within their communities, especially since most 
victims of those crimes are other tribal citizens.  It would be presumptuous 
to believe that all tribes would be supportive of the ability of a federal court 
to depart downward, or upward for that matter, on a sentence when a 
disparity issue exists.  The tribal opt-in, in certain cases in which the 
disparity is substantial, is the friendlier solution to respecting tribal 
sovereignty. 
Of course, some problems will have to be addressed.  Suppose for 
example, a tribal citizen is operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence and has an accident resulting in the death of a passenger.  This 
crime is prosecuted as involuntary manslaughter under federal law, while 
the state may define it as vehicular homicide.  The presumptive sentence 
under the federal sentencing guidelines is forty-eight months, while the 
standard sentence for a first-time offender in the state system is eight 
months—after giving good time credit and parole eligibility consideration.  
This disparity should be significant enough to trigger the tribal opt-in and 
the right of the federal sentencing judge to depart downward.  The state 
sentence, however, is premised upon certain factors that the federal court 
cannot yet predict, including the likeliness of the defendant to behave 
himself in prison in order to become eligible for parole.  This issue will 
have to be addressed in some manner. 
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Just as with the remedy for the disparities in sentencing for crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine,98 resentencing should be an option for those 
tribal citizens whom have felt the brunt of the disparities and are currently 
serving federal sentences.  Certainly for Ms. Deegan and Mr. Boneshirt, if 
the Three Affiliated Tribes and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe exercise the opt-in 
then resentencing may be available to them under federal law.  In short, the 
sentences imposed upon these defendants and other Native defendants 
should be revisited.  Absent some legislative fix, their cases certainly cry 
out for some clemency or resentencing. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It has been more than ten years since the United States Sentencing 
Commission received the Advisory Group Report detailing the disparate 
federal sentencing of Native Americans, an issue the Report notes existed 
well before its issuance.  However, despite the Report’s findings and 
recommendations, Native Americans continue to be disparately sentenced 
when compared to others similarly situated, who are sentenced for similar 
conduct under state law.  Let the United States do justice for Native 
Americans by enacting legislation that will allow all Americans in this 
instance to be treated equally by permitting a tribal voice in the imposition 
of criminal sentences upon tribal citizens.  Such legislation would be both 
just and a demonstration of the United States fulfilling its trust 
responsibility to Indian nations and their citizens. 
  
 
98. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (The law reduced 
the disparity between the amount of crack cocaine and powder cocaine needed to trigger certain 
United States federal criminal penalties from a 100:1 weight ratio to an 18:1 weight ratio and 
eliminated the five year mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine, 
among other provisions.  It also required resentencing of offenders who were impacted by the 
broad disparities in sentences). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Average Sentence for the Ten Most Common Offense Types For Native 
American Offenders in the District of North Dakota Post-Booker  
(January 12, 2005 through September 30, 2012). 
 






 377 100.0 60 
 Assault 77 20.4 32 
 Sexual Abuse 71 18.8 133 
 Drug Trafficking 64 17.0 76 
 Firearms 36 9.5 47 
 Manslaughter 24 6.4 73 
 Admin.of Justice 18 4.8 19 
 Burglary/Breaking and Entering
Larceny 
Embezzlement 
Arson 
Prison Offenses
17
12 
12 
11 
10
4.5
3.2 
3.2 
2.9 
2.7
13 
10 
6 
37 
9 
 
 
